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Remote voting through the Internet provides convenience and 
access to the electorate. At the same time, the security concerns 
facing any distributed application are magnified when the task is 
so crucial to democratic society. In addition, some of the electoral 
process loses transparency when it is encapsulated in information 
technology. In this paper, we examine the public record of three 
recent elections that used Internet voting.  Our specific goal is to 
identify any potential flaws that security experts would recognize, 
but may have not been identified in the rush to implement 
technology. To do this, we present a multiple exploratory case 
study, looking at elections conducted between 2006 and 2007 in 
Estonia, Netherlands, and Switzerland. These elections were 
selected as particularly interesting and accessible, and each 
presents its own technical and security challenges. The electoral 
environment, technical design and process for each election are 
described, including reconstruction of details which are implied 
but not specified within the source material.  
We found that all three elections warrant significant concern 
about voter security, verifiability, and transparency. Usability, 
our fourth area of focus, seems to have been well-addressed in 
these elections. While our analysis is based on public documents 
and previously published reports, and therefore lacking access to 
any confidential materials held by electoral officials, this 
comparative analysis provides interesting insight and consistent 
questions across all these cases.   
Effective review of Internet voting requires an aggressive 
stance towards identifying potential security and operational 
flaws, and we encourage the use of third party reviews with 
critical technology skills during design, programming, and voting 




Index Terms— e-voting, Internet voting, Internet election, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
N the course of the recent development of electronic 
democracy and electronic services, electronic voting has 
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drawn a remarkable degree of attention. Beyond direct 
recording electronic (DRE) voting machines in designated 
polling places, the use of Internet voting to allow for remote 
balloting has been applied in more than 100 elections and in 
14 countries between 1996 and 2007 [27]. Milestones in the 
adoption of Internet voting include the March 2000 Arizona 
Democratic Party’s presidential preference primary election, 
which was the first legally binding election to employ Internet 
voting [29], and the 2007 Parliamentary Elections in Estonia, 
where Internet voting was first used at the national 
governmental level [17]. 
Proponents argue that Internet voting increases voter access 
and participation in the political process, lowers costs, and 
protects against electoral fraud [29]. However, implementing 
Internet voting requires extensive revisions to long-established 
procedures for voting, counting, monitoring and auditing. This 
task is extremely challenging: In the early 2000s, Internet 
voting and related security issues were systematically 
investigated by independent groups of security experts [7], 
[23], [25], who concordantly concluded that technological 
threats to the security, integrity, and secrecy of remote Internet 
voting systems are significant and that the possibility of large-
scale automated attacks leads to a level of risk so high as to be 
unacceptable. A recent example of insufficient security in 
electronic voting systems was demonstrated in an independent 
assessment of the voting systems certified for use in California 
[4]. Within the proprietary code researchers found that one 
piece of software appends a three-letter suffix to a password 
and sends this result over the network, another duplicates the 
same encryption keys in all of its machine source code, and a 
third system uses its own name as a hard-wired password. 
Other flaws arise from elementary coding vulnerabilities and 
flawed cryptography. This demonstrates clearly that critical 
flaws remain an unresolved concern.  
One might argue that e-Commerce systems provide a basis 
for secure Internet voting systems. Unfortunately, there are 
some important differences between the two applications that 
make it difficult to share similar architectures: 
--Impact: Elections are inseparably linked to democracy, 
and can be directly and decisively affected by compromised 
election processes. Democracy relies on broad confidence in 
the integrity of elections as well as the successful completion 
of each transaction. 
--Identity: The voting franchise is usually not transferable, 
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so the identity of the voter must be accurate. In e-Commerce, 
the use of a credit card by an account co-owner is not a 
security failure.  
--Availability: A well-timed assault on an Internet election 
infrastructure, such as a DDoS attack, can delay or invalidate 
returns and disenfranchise voters. A similar attack on an e-
Commerce site would have less serious results, as the buyer 
can either revisit the website after operations are restored or 
select an alternate vendor.  
--Authentication and anonymity: An Internet vote 
requires confirmation of the right to vote and anonymity 
within the vote transaction, an unusual duality. Business 
transactions require authentication through passwords, PINs, 
or biometric data, but the buyer and seller are not usually 
anonymous.  
--Monitoring and audit: When they are made available 
within a voting architecture, plaintext voting receipts may 
capture the voting event, but must also obscure the voter’s 
selections. If a voting receipt showed how a vote was cast in 
plaintext, vote selling and coercion might occur [35]. Voting 
audit trails must also provide protection of the voter’s identity 
while ensuring the integrity of the vote. This also implies that 
access to the audit trail must be protected. In contrast, e-
Commerce customers may also receive receipts for 
transactions, but these receipts often list details in order to 
facilitate resolution of complaints and the efficient delivery of 
goods.  
--Voter privacy: Internet voting does not assure that 
voters’ physical privacy is respected, again raising the spectre 
of coercion. No such concern exists in e-Commerce. 
Despite these characteristics of Internet voting, several 
large-scale Internet elections have been conducted in the 
recent past. To what extent were the requirements, concerns, 
and solutions offered by the academic community employed 
or helpful in the support of reliable democratic processes? We 
address this question by examining three recent European 
elections that employed Internet voting. To the best of our 
knowledge, no prior study has addressed this question by 
analyzing and comparing multiple election cases. In contrast 
to other studies that analyze a single election or election 
system (e.g. [4], [25], [29], [35]), our multiple case study 
provides some basis for empirically-driven generalization. 
Using almost exclusively public documents, published 
literature, and interviews with electoral observers, we identify 
possible security oversights or exploitable gaps, verifiability 
issues, and lack of transparency. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, 
we identify the properties deemed desirable for Internet voting 
based on a review of the literature. Section 3 presents our 
research methodology by explaining how multiple exploratory 
case study analysis is used in this paper to explore three large-
scale Internet elections. Sections 4-6 contain the description 
and the analysis of the particular elections held in Estonia, The 
Netherlands, and Switzerland, respectively. In Section 7, a 
cross-case analysis is conducted. Section 8 concludes the 
paper and provides an outlook on further research. 
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Requirements and desired properties 
In one of its earliest pronouncements, the United Nations 
formulated “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights” 
[42], including a call for universal and equal suffrage and 
voting anonymity. These universal requirements are given 
substance by [14] through specific voting security-related 
properties: these include accuracy, equal voting power (termed 
invulnerability in [14]), and privacy: 
--Accuracy: (i) Votes must not be altered or eliminated, and 
invalid votes must not be counted. (ii) The vote tally must be 
“perfect”, either by preventing or detecting inaccuracy. If 
inaccuracies can be detected, but cannot be corrected, an 
election system is termed “partially accurate” [14].  
--Equal Voting Power: Democratic theory and practice 
requires that: (i) Only eligible voters can vote, and that (ii) 
Eligible voters can vote only once.  
--Privacy: (i) A link between the voter’s identity and the 
voter’s selection(s) must be impossible. (ii) The voter must not 
be capable of proving that she voted in a particular way. This 
property fights vote buying and extortion, but may conflict 
with verifiability, a property defined below.  
While not explicit in [14], the property of usability is 
suggested in the text: “A system is convenient if it allows 
voters to cast their votes quickly, in one session, and with 
minimal equipment or special skills.” [14, p.3]. In addition, 
verifiability is desirable. There are two elements within this 
property: 
--Auditing of votes: The most robust level of verifiability 
allows any citizen or outside body to determine that all votes 
have been counted correctly. A weaker definition of 
verifiability requires only that voters can verify their own 
votes and correct any mistakes without sacrificing their 
privacy [14].  
--Auditing of voting procedures and voting systems: After 
identifying important several election software products [4] 
concluded that the audit and review of voting systems are 
highly important. System evaluation, system testing [12], and 
system certification [15] can be used to demonstrate the 
absence of known problems. However, [28] projects e-voting 
processes into the framework of the Common Criteria and 
concludes that even that effort does not suffice. A useful 
instrument for finding the causes of problems when they occur 
are forensic audit trails (FAT), log files that track each system 
events and form the basis for the detection of malicious 
activity and errors involving the recording and counting of 
votes [34]. 
A final property discussed in the literature is transparency. 
Transparency of the technological and organizational elements 
of an election system and its processes add to the credibility of 
an election. Much of this paper’s analysis comes from review 
of materials that attempt to meet this property. While some 
argue for “security by obscurity,” the need for credibility and 
the significant risk of unintentional or intentional exposure of 
the system’s programming to the public [38] makes relying on 
obscurity for protection untenable. When third-party reviewers 
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can be employed, these reviewers must have the technical 
expertise, time and resources to evaluate election architecture 
designs and implementation. 
B. Voting system design primitives, protocols and attack 
counter-measures 
Much of the technologically-oriented e-voting literature 
discusses alternative design primitives, protocols and 
technological attack counter-measures. Reference [26] 
identifies three general design approaches for building e-
voting systems based on three primitives. Mixnet-based 
primitives, introduced by Chaum [10], are part of the protocols 
of [24] and [39] and are used in the e-voting system SureVote 
[9]. Homomorphic encryption-based primitives were 
introduced by Benaloh [2], used in [1], [3], and [21] and 
implemented in E-Vote [20]. Blind-signature-based primitives 
were introduced by Fujioka et al. [19], are used in [8] and [19] 
and adopted in Sensus [14]. Further protocols are provided in 
[26], who also provide examples for some other approaches 
that are not based on any of the above primitives.  
Voting protocols are dedicated to enhancing security in 
communication, but are of limited value against security 
threats to voting devices (e.g., keyloggers, viruses). Reference 
[7] proposes specialized operating systems as one mechanism 
for protecting security-critical applications from malicious 
code. Voting operating systems are designed to protect 
security-critical applications from malicious code using 
security properties such as process isolation. Further 
instruments proposed are closed platforms employing 
smartcards, and trusted computing elements. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
We present our methodology in two parts: First we explain 
why we chose exploratory multiple case study as the primary 
research methodology. Second, we present the design of our 
case study. 
A. Exploratory multiple case study analysis 
As Internet elections are embedded in a societal 
environment, a comprehensive analysis of these elections 
needs to consider organizational and societal concerns along 
with the technology employed. According to [44], the 
appropriateness of a research strategy depends on three 
attributes: (1) the form of the research questions, (2) the 
control of behavioural events, and (3) the focus on 
contemporary events. Our research poses “what” and “how” 
questions, does not allow for controlling or manipulating 
behavioral events (elections) and focuses on contemporary 
elections, so we chose exploratory case study as our research 
methodology. In order to get a more comprehensive picture 
and to make the findings more robust, we selected multiple 
elections, resulting in an exploratory multiple case study. 
B. Research design 
Our research design follows the recommendations of [43-
44] regarding exploratory multiple case study design. As we 
are focusing on Internet elections, we use one framework for 
all of our cases. We first describe briefly the electoral 
environment. We then describe the overall technological 
architecture of the Internet voting system, and then move to 
pre-electoral, electoral, and post-electoral processes in terms 
of technological and organizational procedures. We conclude 
each case with an analysis which systematically matches the 
properties of the elections with the election requirements as 
presented in Section 2.1. 
To identify the cases for study, we examined a literature 
review on Internet voting [27] and the e-voting database of 
239 elections provided on http://db.e-voting.cc, where we 
excluded those that were non-political, small-scale (less than 
1000 eligible voters) or conducted before 2006. We examined 
the public documentation for the elections looking for cases 
using innovative technology and appearing in academic or lay 
media. 
We also considered diversity of country, election level 
(national vs. local) and voting eligibility (everyone or only 
voters living abroad). We also applied subjective preferences 
of the authors, including the fluency of the authors with 
particular non-English languages. We ultimately selected 
elections in Estonia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland for 
comparison: 
--Estonia is the first country worldwide to introduce legally-
binding, nation-wide Internet voting without any 
preconditions. The election under investigation is the national 
parliamentary election conducted in March 2007. 
--The Netherlands was an early adopter of information and 
communication technology for voting. We examine the Dutch 
2006 national parliamentary election, where both stand-alone 
electronic voting machines nation-wide as well as Internet 
voting for citizens living abroad were employed.  
--Switzerland is the country with the most experience in 
conducting legally-binding local elections via the Internet. The 
election under analysis is the March 2007 local referendum, 
where Internet voting was used in the city of Neuchâtel. 
To get a robust picture of each election we visited the web 
site for each election’s supervising authority, which gave 
access to official observations (e.g. OSCE reports). We 
extended the literature review by searching scientific papers 
on these elections and on the computer systems they employed 
through pertinent databases, including the IEEE Xplore 
Digital Library and the Web of Science. In the Estonian and 
Swiss elections we were able to arrange informal interviews 
with election observers. 
In regards to the Estonian election we found several helpful 
sources. The OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission 
Report [31] provides a description of the election and how 
Internet voting was integrated. It is based on interviews with 
government representatives and state officials, election 
administration, political parties, academics, and civil society. 
However, the security analysis is at a high level and 
exemplary only. The Report for the Council of Europe by the 
European Union Democracy Observatory [18] is based on 
telephone interviews with voters and is purely non-technical. 
The Estonian National Electoral Committee websites [16-17] 
provide a description of the e-voting process and statistics.  
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The Dutch election was also observed by the OSCE, which 
provides the Election Assessment Mission Report [32]. We 
were also provided with an internal and non-confidential 
OSCE report that focuses on problems with e-voting machines 
and Internet voting [33]. This report is based on interviews 
with participants and on the observation of the election, but 
while this report was somewhat critical of the process, it is not 
generally available to the public. We also used [22], which 
provides a complete technical description and a verifiability 
analysis of RIES, the Internet election system used. 
The selected Swiss case was not observed by the OSCE or 
any other independent organization. The “Schweizerischer 
Bundesrat” [40] and the “République et Canton de Neuchâtel” 
[36] provide high-level descriptions of the elections. 
References [11] and [40] provide a technical description and 
analysis, respectively, of the Pnyx system, the source for some 
of the components used in the election. 
IV.  PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN ESTONIA 
Our first case study examines the 3 March 2007 elections 
for the Estonian parliament. 30,275 voters used Internet 
voting, representing 3.4% of the eligible voters and 5.4% of 
the votes cast [17]. 
A. Electoral environment 
In advance of the Estonian election voters could submit 
paper ballots or use the Internet to register their vote. On 
Election Day, they could cast their ballots in polling stations. 
An important feature of this election was the voters’ ability to 
change their votes during the advance voting period, either by 
voting again through the Internet or by casting a ballot paper 
at a polling station. The voter could change her Internet vote 
an unlimited number of times, with the last electronic ballot 
being the only one counted; a vote cast by paper was final and 
annulled all Internet votes cast by the voter. Voters who cast a 
vote by Internet were not allowed to cast a vote on Election 
Day. 
A cornerstone of the Internet voting system in Estonia was 
the exploitation of the existing national identification 
document (ID card), which is legally accepted for 
authentication and digital signatures. The computer used by 
the voter must have a smart card reader installed in order to 
process the digitally-enabled ID. Each ID card is accompanied 
with two Personal Identification Numbers: PIN1 is required to 
access the personal data stored on the ID and to use the ID 
card for personal identification to web-based services, while 
PIN2 is required for digital signing (http://www.id.ee/11039). 
B. Design 
The Estonian Internet voting system consists of the 
components shown in Figure 1. The Voter Application 
software allows citizens to cast their vote. Independent 
applications were designed for Windows (a signed ActiveX 
web browser component) and Apple Mac OS and Linux 
(stand-alone applications). The Internet Server provides the 
Voter Application to voters, stores the list of eligible voters, 
and forwards votes to the Vote Storage Server. The Vote 
Storage Server records votes during the voting period. The 
Counting Server is an offline, stand-alone computer, used to 
decrypt and count the votes recorded. The decryption of votes 
is performed using a Hardware Security Module (HSM). The 
module generates the public and private key of the Counting 
Server. The Certificate Authority Server provides the voters’ 
digital certificates. A private software company developed all 
of these components, except for the Certification Server, based 
on specifications developed by the Estonian National Electoral 
Committee (NEC). The Estonian Informatics Centre is 
responsible for the physical hosting of the servers, as well as 
for providing Internet connections. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Architecture of the Estonian Internet election system  
C. Electoral processes 
The current Estonian citizen ID card contains personal data 
and a private key on an embedded chip, providing individual 
identification for voting. The Internet voting process used in 
this election resembles the dual envelope method used for 
paper-based absentee voting. The Internet voter software 
creates an inner envelope (which is essentially an encrypted 
vote) and an outer envelope (which is essentially a digital 
signature).  
The voting process is depicted in Figure 2. The Voter 
Application requests authentication data from the voter’s ID 
card. To proceed, the voter enters PIN1 to identify herself. The 
Voter Application establishes an SSL connection with the 
Internet Server and sends authentication data to this server, 
which then looks up the voter lists to verify the eligibility of 
the voter. As the voter lists contain the Personal Identification 
Number (PIC) of each eligible voter, we assume that 
authentication data sent by the Voter Application also contain 
the voter’s PIC. 
The voter chooses one candidate by clicking on the name of 
the candidate in the client software. Unlike paper balloting, the 
application software prevents blank or physically spoiled 
ballots. The vote and a random number are encrypted with the 
public key of the Counting Server. In order to cast the vote, 
the voter must type in PIN2. PIN2 enables the card to sign the 
encrypted vote and is not transferred to the Internet Server. 
The encrypted vote is sent to the Internet Server, which 
verifies that the digital signature corresponds to the session 
owner. At this point, the description of the voting process in 
[31], p. 13, is not precise regarding what exactly is signed (we 
assume the encrypted vote only). When the vote is received by 
the Vote Storage Server, an entry is recorded in a log-file 
(LOG1), using the format (PIC, hash(enc(vote), random 
number)) [16]. The use of a hash function is intended to 
eliminate a link between the voter’s decision and their identity 
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  Fig. 2. Internet voting process in Estonia’s 2007 parliamentary elections 
The Internet Server forwards the encrypted vote to the Vote 
Storage Server, which accesses the Certificate Authority 
Server and requests the voter’s certificate in order to confirm 
the validity of the digital signature that is attached to the 
encrypted vote. At the end of validation, the voter receives an 
on-screen confirmation that the vote has been cast. The 
encrypted vote remains on the Vote Storage Server until 
counting and tabulation is performed on Election Day. It is not 
clear whether the confirmation consists of text only, a unique 
confirmation code, or other information. 
As each citizen can vote by both advance ballot and the 
Internet, a consolidation of votes is needed. After receiving 
lists from polling stations regarding any voters who cast a 
paper ballot during advance voting and who also cast a vote by 
Internet, NEC staff mark the corresponding electronic votes on 
the Vote Storage Server as “not to be counted”. It is important 
to note that at this stage of the election a link between the 
(encrypted) vote and voter’s identity exists. Cancelled Internet 
votes are logged in a file (LOG2), using the same format as in 
LOG1 with the reason for cancellation. Advance paper ballots 
are counted with those cast at the polls. At the end of Election 
Day, the NEC staff burns a CD from the Vote Storage Server 
that contains the last encrypted electronic vote of each voter. 
This CD is sealed and given to the Chairman of the NEC. 
The counting of the electronic votes takes place on Election 
Day: The encrypted votes are transferred to the Counting 
Server by a CD-ROM. All entries transferred to the Counting 
Server are recorded in log file (LOG3) using the same format 
as LOG1. After the insertion of six physical keys to enable the 
HSM, the Counting Server decrypts the votes. Reference [16] 
reports that each decrypted vote is checked against the 
candidate list to determine if it is possible to vote for the 
candidate in that constituency. If the candidate number is 
incorrect, the vote is declared invalid. However, [31] states 
that the voter is provided an electronic ballot with candidates 
of the voter’s electoral district and that ballots cannot be 
spoiled by the voter, which seems inconsistent. A 
corresponding notice is recorded in a log file (LOG4) in the 
format hash(encrypted(vote)). Valid votes are tabulated and 
recorded in a log file (LOG5), again in the format 
hash(encrypted(vote)). After the votes were counted on the 
Counting Server, a new CD is burned with the results. The CD 
is taken to a personal computer where the results are analyzed. 
D. Analysis 
Security: The Estonian Internet voting system shows 
design weaknesses with regard to all of our targeted security 
properties. Accuracy is endangered in multiple ways: On the 
client side, the use of card readers coupled to home computers 
rather than devices with their own display and keyboard 
makes the process vulnerable to PC viruses that change the 
input and the output of the card reader. An unwary voter may 
download fraudulent software purporting to support the 
electoral process. Although the authenticity of the website and 
the client voting software can be validated by the voter, as the 
ActiveX software is signed, voters may not be familiar with 
browser certificate checking. If fraudulent software is in place, 
votes may be altered or eliminated by while simultaneously 
presenting the voter a faked confirmation message. The voter 
has no means to confirm that her vote has been transmitted 
without distortion. 
Serious threats exist on server side as well. The Internet 
Server and the Voting Server have code to invalidate votes, 
and the Voting Server and the Counting Server can add votes. 
Logging the process does not ensure that only invalid votes 
have been actually removed without confirmation that the logs 
are accurate. 
Reference [31] reports that the PC used to read the CD 
containing the results was connected to the Internet during part 
of the time the counting procedure was conducted, a 
somewhat risky choice when considering the role of this 
device in the process. It is unclear whether any 
countermeasures against Denial-of-Service attacks against the 
Internet Server and the Vote Storage Server had been taken. 
There is an important privacy issue with the Estonian e-voting 
system. As the voting process allows voters to cast multiple 
and overwriting ballots, the Vote Storage Server needs to keep 
a link between the encrypted vote and the identity of the voter. 
Storing this link is a serious violation of the privacy principle. 
These security issues are rooted largely in the design of the 
Estonian election system. While they may well be managed by 
well-crafted processing, we have not seen external evidence to 
document their resolution. 
Usability: The Estonian e-voting system requires the voter 
to have a card reader available and to install the card reader 
software. As of November 2006 over one million digitally-
enabled ID cards had been issued with almost 900,000 eligible 
voters [31].. In this 2007 election, 98.8% of Internet voters 
used a Microsoft Windows-based web browser, through which 
ActiveX voting software was downloaded and executed [31]. 
According to [5], the voting software comes with a self-
explanatory point-and-click interface, but is available only in 
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Estonian. As about 15% of Estonian citizens speak Russian as 
their mother tongue [31], there should be concern about 
disenfranchisement of the Russian-speaking minority. 
Verifiability: It appears that individual voters cannot 
confirm the content of their Internet votes for lack of an 
accessible audit trail. In case of complaints, election officials 
can consult the log files described in the previous section and 
shown in Figure 3. 
 
  Fig. 3. Audit log files stored in Estonia’s 2007 parliamentary elections 
 
While these log files are useful, they are not a replacement 
for a process that verifies votes for the individual. For 
example, if a vote was deleted before being recorded in 
LOG1, the voter cannot prove that she has cast a ballot. A 
malicious individual with access to the Vote Storage Server 
also has access to the PIC codes, as these are required to 
validate the entries. The PIC codes could be used in 
combination with a fraudulent but properly formatted hashed 
vote to create votes for non-participants. Similarly, a 
determined insider can modify votes or substitute invalid votes 
for valid entries, all of which would be supported by the false 
audit trail in LOG2 and LOG3. The use of LOG4 to track 
votes for invalid candidates subsequent to the insertion of a 
false vote also appears possible. If all log files are correct, it 
can be proved that no votes have been added or deleted by 
validating the two constraints LOG1=LOG2+LOG3 and 
LOG3=LOG4+LOG5.  
In the absence of explicit review, the correctness of the 
software is an assumption rather than an audited truth. 
Although some practical tests of the Voter Application and the 
Vote Storage Server are reported, there was no obligation to 
certify or test the system, the Internet voting system was not 
officially certified by an independent body and no full end-to-
end logic and accuracy test was performed on the system [31]. 
An external auditing firm (KPMG Baltics AS) monitored 
and checked the activities of the NEC against written 
documentation describing the necessary steps and procedures. 
However, the final report is not public, and the external 
auditing company did not conduct any post-election audits. 
Overall, the Estonian e-voting system had practically no 
verifiability. While we do not claim malfeasance, we do note 
the opportunity for problems. 
Transparency: According to [31], the election processes 
and the management of the Internet voting system were made 
transparent to the OECD, all political parties, and accredited 
observers. This included the opportunity to review the 
documentation of the system, the source code of the software, 
and all of the setup procedures in the process. However, the 
OECD report says [31, p. 20]: “One reason cited by some 
political party representatives for not observing the internet 
voting process was (…) the lack of qualified personnel who 
could understand the process and provide effective control 
(…).” Overall, the apparent lack of thorough oversight by 
independent security experts and unpublished audits are blows 
to claims of transparency. 
E. Conclusion 
Although the Estonian e-voting system falls far short of 
what we would consider a secure process, these concerns are 
not shared by officials and voters. In contrast, e-voting 
continues to be popular in Estonia, as the e-voting turnout at 
the 2009 European parliament elections was double that of 
2007The desire for user simplicity, high turnout, enthusiasm 
for the new Estonian technology base and the opportunity to 
draw a structural parallel with traditional elections were 
important drivers in the design of the Internet voting software 
[5], [16]. Reference [5] cites an ERC member saying “The 
goal is to make things easier for people, to increase 
participation [...]It’s impossible to build a system that is 100 
percent secure. But it's as safe as it can be.” and the e-voting 
project manager “You trust your money with the [I]nternet, 
and you won't trust your vote? I don't think so.” 
V. DUTCH ELECTIONS TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
This case study refers to the 22 November 2006 Dutch 
elections to its House of Representatives. The government 
opted to use Internet voting as an experiment to support Dutch 
voters residing abroad, responding in part to previous 
problems with mail balloting. Moreover the purpose was to 
make it easier for the voter by non-place-dependent voting. 
They employed the Rijnland Internet Election System (RIES), 
developed originally for the local Rijnland District Water 
Board elections in 2004 [32]. RIES was used by 19,929 voters, 
a scant 0.16% e-voting turnout. 
A. Electoral environment 
Dutch voters select one candidate from a pre-designated list. 
In-country voters had the freedom to use any polling station in 
the country, and each station had direct recording electronic 
machines (DREs). Outside the country, Dutch voters used 
either Internet or mail voting, which is where our analysis is 
directed.  Internet voters accessed the front-end of the voting 
system directly, while mail ballots were recorded by election 
employees into the same system. We have no information on 
how the electronic votes and the votes cast in polling stations 
were merged. 
B. Design 
In contrast to the Estonian case, RIES is directly derived 
from academic research. RIES is a simplified version of the 
system proposed by Robers [37]; its implementation differs 
from that proposed in the research by eliminating smartcards 
and voter-specific public key pairs and implementing an 
alternative organizational structure. Our reconstruction of the 
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technical details of RIES is based on [22] and [26], which 
provides a process-oriented perspective. As we have no 
information available on the architecture of RIES as 
implemented in the election under consideration, we depict the 




Fig. 4. Architecture of the Dutch Internet election system 
Prior to the election each eligible citizen living abroad could 
request access to the Internet-based system and a secret key 
for individual access. These voters access the Voter 
Application, implemented as a JavaScript application 
embedded in a web site. The JavaScript code performs all 
user-side cryptography. The Internet Server receives encrypted 
votes from the remote PC, which are then stored in the Voting 
Server. Both servers are operated by SURFnet, a Dutch 
Internet service provider. (http://www.usenix.org/event/ 
lisa06/bofs.html). The Publication and Counting Server is 
operated by the company TTPI, developers of the RIES 
system. 
C. Electoral processes 
The RIES election scheme supports voter authorization, 
encrypted voting, and transparent identification of votes cast 
through the use of encryption keys and hashing. We draw this 
description largely from [22]. Before the election, TTPI 
generates an electronic identification code (El_ID) and a 
cryptographic DES key for each registered Internet voter. The 
El_ID and key are sent via post to each voter. In addition, 
TTPI prepares a table that applies the same user-specific key 
to the El_ID to create a Message Authentication Code (MAC), 
resulting in an encrypted “Voter ID”. In addition, TTPI 
generates a set of MACs encrypting all valid votes for the 
specific voter. The resulting MACs are hashed using the 
Modified Detection Code (MDC2) one-way function [6], and 
published in a reference table. The TTPI copy of the user-
specific DES keys is then destroyed. Figure 5 summarizes the 
pre-election procedure.  
The application of MDC is crucial. If encrypted votes were 
to be published in the pre-election table without hashing, the 
encrypted values corresponding to specific candidates would 
represent valid votes and could be sent by anyone. As 
published MDC values are generated by TTPI through a one-
way function, attackers do not know which values would 
match the corresponding MDC values. 
 During the election period, the Internet voter visits the 
election web page “internetstemmen.nl”. This site holds a 
SHA 1 digital certificate to confirm its authenticity to voters. 
The voter then selects her candidate j, and enters her election 
key Ki into the appropriate field. The PC-based JavaScript 
code computes what the designers call the “technical vote,” 
containing two values: her Voter ID, calculated by MACKi(El 
ID), and the hashed vote, MACKi(CAN_IDj). The technical 
vote is shown on the voter’s screen and sent to the Internet 
Server through an SSL secured connection to SURFnet. The 
voter then receives a confirmation that the technical vote was 
received successfully. The voter is advised to store the 
technical vote after receiving this confirmation in order to be 
capable of performing a validation check. 
 
Fig. 5. Pre-election phase in RIES [22, p. 7] 
 
When paper votes are used, TTPI records them into the 
electronic system. TTPI scans paper ballots (mail votes) and 
captures the Voter ID and the MAC for the selected candidate. 
No information is found describing how paper ballots are 
treated after their entry into the system.  
After the election period, SURFnet hands over all technical 
votes it collected to TTPI. TTPI computes the (keyless) MDC 
hash values over the technical votes, yielding values that can 
be matched against the MDC values in the tables generated 
before the election. Then the results are tabulated.  
The use of reference tables with MDC values of all valid 
technical votes permits automated validation of technical 
votes. In order for a technical vote to be valid, its MDC hash 
value needs to be in the pre-election reference table. Votes that 
do not comply with this rule are marked as invalid and logged 
with a reason code. Figure 6 shows this process in detail. 
D. Analysis 
Security: As with the Estonian system, a downloaded voting 
client makes it vulnerable to infection or substitution with 
malicious software. An infected or a rouge clone of the client 
could read the DES key Ki from voter i as she enters it, 
calculate and send the technical vote for a preferred candidate 
j by computing MACKi(CAN_IDj) while displaying the 
technical vote MACKi(CAN_IDl) for the voter’s true choice, 
candidate l. Neither the voter nor any other involved party can 
detect this fraud during election. Although the voter can detect 
this fraud when the MDC values of technical votes are 
published, she cannot prove that the vote has been altered.  
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Fig. 6. Post-election phase in RIES [22] 
 
No server-side party could add or alter votes without access 
to the DES keys. SURFnet would need the key of a voter to 
compute valid technical votes, and modifications by TTPI 
could have been detected by matching technical votes 
recorded by SURFnet with technical votes used by TTPI. 
However, we do not know whether this consistency check was 
conducted. TTPI could not delete votes without this being 
noticed if the SURFNet files were intact. As the single point 
of recording, SURFnet could have deleted technical votes 
without notice: SURFnet had the data to compute the MDC 
hashes on each vote they receive, and could combine this data 
with the pre-election tables and delete technical votes without 
detection. Again, we argue that this is a possible flaw in the 
design which needs to be articulated, and do not doubt the 
goodwill of any involved party. 
It was possible to check that only valid votes were counted, 
as MDC values of all valid votes were published in the pre-
election reference table and invalid votes would not have lead 
to any MDC value published. However, inaccuracies could 
have been introduced in at least two ways: First, The election 
design does in principle allow TTPI to conduct an incorrect 
assignment of MDC values to candidates in the pre-election 
table so that technical votes would not be counted as cast. 
Validation of the assignment requires knowledge of the 
voters’ keys, which only the voters have after the tables are 
generated. Thus, it is important that the MDC calculation be 
reviewed carefully. While each voter has the data needed to 
confirm their candidate’s MDCs and the resulting technical 
vote, the algorithm is sufficiently challenging to make this 
unlikely without third-party tools.  
Another weakness arises from how RIES was used in the 
2006 Dutch elections: Mail votes were transformed into 
Internet votes and then integrated into a single process. A mail 
vote and its technical representation are not seen by SURFnet, 
allowing votes to be added, deleted, or altered at TTPI. The 
technical and organizational protections afforded to Internet 
votes do not protect mail ballots from tampering.  
We recognize two concerns about access. As the user’s 
voting documentation is distributed by mail, ineligible voters 
might accidently or intentionally acquire a valid DES key. As 
SURFnet was a single point of vote recording, they had to take 
technical countermeasures against DoS attacks in order to 
ensure that eligible voters could vote.  
There are two important privacy issues in the 2006 Dutch 
elections: The deletion of user keys by TTPI, while 
appropriate, is not sufficient to guarantee privacy. Complete 
privacy requires deletion of linkage between voter identity on 
one hand and the key, technical votes, and MDC hashes on the 
other. In addition, as the voter has access to her technical vote, 
it is possible to coerce them into producing it. This in turn can 
be combined with their DES key to determine their selections. 
Thus vote buying and coercion is possible. 
Usability: While voter registration and vote casting appear 
simple, the validation of votes is not. To validate that their 
vote was properly recorded, voters need to determine the 
MDC hash of their technical vote. Reference [22] reports 
complaints about the complexity of vote-checking. Enabling 
voters to validate their recorded vote encourages them to do 
so, but a highly complex validation procedure dissuades them 
from using this feature. This in turn may discourage them 
from participating in future electronic voting, even though 
paper ballots have no verification at all. As noted earlier, the 
pre-election verification of MDCs values was similarly 
complex, and therefore unlikely to be used. A third concern 
refers to the procedure that was necessary to validate the 
overall correctness of the counting. The description of the 
laborious procedure [22] shows that the validation was beyond 
the capabilities of most voters. 
Verifiability: The RIES design provided a mechanism for 
voters to verify that their votes were counted as cast through 
the published post-election tables. This assumes that that the 
voter was both willing and capable to compute the MDC value 
of his/her technical vote. In the case of an erroneously deleted 
vote, however, it was difficult to prove that she actually voted 
if SURFnet did not support the claim. Post-election review of 
correct totals depended on the accuracy of the post-election 
tables. As post-election tables included transcribed mail votes 
that were not in the pre-election publication, there was no way 
to verify completeness or correctness from the tables alone.  
During the election, OSCE observers visited the 
Netherlands and provided a general report and a 
supplementary report dedicated to electronic voting 
components and processes [33]. This report mentions that the 
RIES system had previously been used in the 2004 elections 
for two regional water control boards. We found no official 
report on these earlier elections, but fortunately [33] 
performed an independent assessment of the 2004 RIES use. 
For the election under this review there do not seem to be any 
auditing reports available publically, so we cannot review how 
the audit was conducted.  
Transparency: While the election design of RIES is 
transparent, large parts of the technological infrastructure, 
organizational election processes, and auditing are not. We 
found no information on the specific architecture used in the 
2006 parliamentary elections and, in contrast to the client-side 
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JavaScript code, the software used on the SURFnet server(s) 
and the TTPI server(s) is not open to review [22]. We are also 
concerned about the election procedures themselves. As one 
firm generates and distributes keys, computes technical votes, 
and creates the pre- and post-election reference tables, we 
regard it as most crucial that these procedures are fully 
transparent. The detailed specification for the deletion of keys, 
for example, has been deemed security sensitive and classified 
as confidential. The OSCE report [33, p. 13] concludes that 
“[…]far too many details of the electronic voting systems […] 
remain inaccessible to the public.” 
E. Conclusion 
Although the theoretical system provided by Robers [37] 
provides a promising approach for conducting secure and 
verifiable Internet elections, the application of RIES in the 
2006 parliamentary elections reveals deficiencies in terms of 
security, usability, verifiability, and transparency. This 
election demonstrates that the inclusion of sound theoretical 
concepts is insufficient to conduct high-quality Internet 
elections. The powerful role of external vendors without 
transparency and the laborious efforts to achieve practical 
verifiability raise concerns about this experience.  
Rijnland started their development by asking a third party to 
identify the security risks involved with setting up an Internet 
voting system. The results included that many risks involved 
in voting by Internet are not higher than in voting by ordinary 
mail and that risks typical to Internet settings such as DDoS 
attacks and Trojan horses on client machines can be 
successfully addressed with procedural countermeasures for 
the specific situation of Internet voting [33]. The report itself 
is not available for public review.  
Interestingly, the Dutch government has eliminated Internet 
voting from its 2008 Water Board elections and the 2009 EU 
Parliament elections. The Dutch Ministry of the Interior 
decided in 2008 to reject electronic voting machines because 
of concerns about their security. 
VI. CANTONAL REFERENDUM IN SWITZERLAND DUTCH 
ELECTIONS TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
This case study refers to the 11 March 2007 cantonal 
referendum in Neuchâtel/Neuenberg, Switzerland, where 
1,538 voters used Internet voting, representing 1.44 % of the 
population and 2.54% of votes cast. 
A. Electoral environment 
“Vote électronique” is part of a larger portal (Guichet 
Unique, GU) that offers a set of e-Goverment services. Each 
GU registrant receives a user code and a password by mail. 
For the 2007 Neuchâtel election, voters could choose between 
three voting modalities: she could vote traditionally, by mail, 
or by Internet through the GU portal. In order to prevent 
voters from casting multiple ballots, votes were stored in a 




The design of the Internet voting system is documented 
publically only at a descriptive level [36], [40]. According to 
[36], parts of the remote voting system Pnyx [41] of the 
company Scytl are used. Pnyx is proprietary software and 
closed to public scrutiny. To counter the (now) obvious 
concerns associated with proprietary software, an independent 
review team received access to the Pnyx.core ODBP 1.0 
voting software. We use the review team’s reports [11] on 
Pnyx components used in the Neuchâtel election: the Voting 
Server, the Voting Proxy, and the Ballot Box [36]. Other 
important elements of the packaged Pnyx voting protocol, 
such as are cryptographic key pairs for the voters, the 
technological infrastructure used at polling places, and Voter 
Verified Paper Audit Trails are not used in the Neuchâtel 
election. These functions are performed through election-
specific customizations, out of the scope of the Pnyx core. 
Figure 7 presents the design of the Internet Voting System 
used in the Neuchâtel election as we have reconstructed it. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Architecture of the Neuchâtel Internet election system 
The integration of proprietary packaged and custom 
software creates a somewhat more layered and obscure 
architecture than in the cases discussed earlier. Voters use a 
digitally signed Java applet as their Voter Application. The 
vote is transmitted to the Internet Server, which communicates 
with the Central Register. Once this process completes, the 
vote is transferred to the Pnyx Manager. Reference [36] 
identifies the Pnyx Manager’s responsibility as basic 
configuring of the votes, but does not provide any further 
explanation. According to [11], the Pnyx Proxy is primarily 
responsible for relaying communications between the “Voting 
Client” (here, the Pnyx Manager) and the Voting Server, 
which in turn stores the encrypted votes. When the Electoral 
Board provides the appropriate keys, the Tallying Server 
opens the digital Ballot Box and the ballots are decrypted and 
tallied. 
C. Electoral processes 
As with the system design, some parts of the election 
processes are different from the standard Pnyx and are not 
documented in detail. Unclear parts are marked with a 
question mark in Figure 8, which shows the key electoral 
processes as we understand them. 
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Fig. 8. Internet voting process in Neuchâtel Internet election system 
 
In the pre-election period, one cryptographic public key pair 
(pu,pr) is generated. The public election key pu is used by the 
Voter Application for the encryption of votes. The private key 
pr is decomposed into two parts, which are stored onto digital 
cards. Each card is password-protected, with the card-specific 
password being chosen by a member of the electoral 
committee. The cards are then sealed and stored in a 
physically protected environment.  
Voters registered at GU received an election- and voter-
specific validation and confirmation code before the election. 
To cast a vote, the voter logs in the GU portal. The Internet 
Server validates the voter’s eligibility through a request to the 
Central Register Server and generates an individual ballot, 
which is presented through a Java Applet on the voter’s PC. 
The voter marks the electronic ballot and confirms her vote 
with her validation code. The vote is encrypted with the public 
election key and sent together with the validation code to the 
Internet Server. The Internet Server reviews the confirmation 
code of the particular user and sends the encrypted vote and 
the confirmation code to the Voting Server, which stores them. 
The description of the Internet Server does not provide any 
information on how it determines the confirmation code and 
where it is stored. We assume that it sends a request to the 
Central Register Server.  
The Voting Server acknowledges the receipt of the 
encrypted vote. Finally the Internet Server sends the 
confirmation code and the acknowledgement back to the Voter 
Application. The voter can validate the server’s authenticity 
by matching the returned code with the confirmation 
validation code that was sent to him/her prior to the election.  
After the election, the encrypted vote and confirmation code 
pairs are exported from the Voting Server to an external 
storage medium and then imported into the Tallying Server. 
The electoral committee members appear at the location of the 
Tallying Server and provide their passwords to access the 
digital cards that hold the decomposed private election key. 
The key is then assembled and used to decrypt those votes that 
are linked to a confirmation code that is related to an eligible 
voter. Votes that are not validated are removed.  
To perform its function, the Tallying Server appears to need 
the list of eligible voters and their confirmation codes. This 
validation occurs while voter identities are still linked to the 
encrypted votes. The validated votes are separated from the 
confirmation codes and decrypted with the assembled election 
key. Finally the decrypted votes are shuffled before they are 
published. Confirmation codes of all validated votes are also 
published; by randomizing the order presentation a link 
between confirmation codes and votes cannot be discerned. 
D. Analysis 
Security: The pre-election procedures appear to be 
adequate to secure the private key. However, no information is 
available about the key decomposition procedure, the number 
of digital cards, and the mapping of partial keys onto cards. As 
confirmation codes are published after the vote, an individual 
can confirm that their ballot was part of the final tally. 
However, the vote might have been altered and counted other 
than cast in several ways. As the Voting Application is 
executed on a PC, it is vulnerable to various local threats, as 
discussed in the earlier cases [25]. In the absence of a digital 
signature, the vote can be replaced by another vote encrypted 
with the public election key by malicious software 
components embedded in the voting software or any other 
software that is executed on the Application Server, Pnyx 
Manager, Pnyx Proxy, or Tallying Server. The voter has no 
mechanism to detect the alteration of her vote if the 
confirmation code remains intact. Similarly in the absence of 
careful monitoring, server-side software components could 
add votes with confirmation codes for voters who have not 
actually voted and block access to voters whose codes were 
compromised.  
We did not find any information on how the communication 
between the Java Applet and the Internet Server is secured, or 
how and when how the Central Register Server records each 
to prevent any further ballots cast by the particular user. 
The Tallying Server apparently validates the encrypted 
votes by checking whether the corresponding confirmation 
codes are assigned to eligible voters. Assumed that the 
software on the Tallying Server accomplishes this task 
correctly, it is assured that only eligible voters can vote. 
However, we have no information on whether the Pnyx 
component is used or any other software. 
The system design limits each eligible voter to a single 
ballot, as a successful vote is stored until counting. However, 
this concept might be compromised during implementation. 
We cannot assess this any further, as the program code is 
neither published nor has been certified by an independent 
body. 
In contrast to the Estonian election, the voter is not provided 
any option to overwrite his/her vote. As a result, vote buying 
and coercion might occur. We do not know whether the 
election system was protected against DoS attacks. Reference 
[11] says that the Pnyx system has no apparent DoS 
countermeasures. This is a concern, though such measures 
may be part of the GU environment. 
The voter’s confirmation code and encrypted vote remain 
linked to each other until the votes are decrypted on the 
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Tallying Server. It is therefore possible to link the decrypted 
vote and the voter, who then becomes vulnerable to insider 
threats or malicious software.  
While the Neuchâtel election process takes important steps 
towards security, we remain concerned about the possibility of 
malicious election software and insider attacks. We also note 
that we have not uncovered any published evidence of a 
formal proof of the security protocols employed by Pnyx or 
within the GU portal. Again, the concerns raised by [11] about 
the implementation of the Pnyx system, including weaknesses 
in the bit strength of cryptographic schemes and in the shuffle 
procedure concern us. 
Usability: In order to cast a ballot electronically, the voter 
only needs to have registered with GU and the election-
specific validation code sent by mail. Any web browser that is 
Java-enabled can access the portal without additional 
hardware or software No complaints on the voting interface 
are reported in the literature.  
Verifiability: In contrast to the full Pnyx.core ODBP 1.0 
system that provides for Voter Verified Paper Audit Trails, the 
Neuchâtel election does not allow voters to verify whether 
their votes were counted as cast and whether the overall tally 
is correct. As the published confirmation codes are separated 
from the votes, voters can verify that their ballot was received, 
but does not demonstrate that its contents were tallied 
properly. Although the Pnyx system keeps various electronic 
logs [41] we do not know whether they are used and analyzed 
during the Swiss election in order to track the integrity of cast 
votes. 
Reference [40] reports that in 2005 four test elections and 
three official elections were conducted and that two external 
security audits were conducted but the reports are not 
published. Interestingly, [11] reports that the canton Neuchâtel 
performed an internal security audit of the Scytl Pnyx.core 
software, but has not made their report available to Scytl, in 
contrast to the Finnish group at the University of Turku, which 
made the report available on the Internet 
(http://www.vaalit.fi/uploads/5bq7gb9t01z.pdf). 
Reference [40] also reports that the electoral committee 
members cast test votes, to check the integrity of the election 
system. While testing the correctness of intended functionality 
is vital, rigourous software testing requires a focused attempt 
to find flaws.  
Transparency: We found only high-level descriptions of 
the Internet election system. The election was not monitored 
by an independent organization, such as the OECD. As 
mentioned in the discussion of verifiability, the canton 
Neuchâtel has not published their audit of the Pnyx system. 
Confidence in the system and process would be greatly 
improved with additional external review of election 
procedures, technological components and audit results. 
E. Conclusion 
The Neuchâtel e-voting system largely ignores threats 
through infected PCs, shows deficiencies in secrecy of votes, 
and is susceptible to vote buying and coercion. The election 
system also does not provide any substantial verifiability and 
transparency. 
We understand that Switzerland and its cantons are 
particularly interested in conducting Internet-based voting, 
because the political system in Switzerland is based on direct 
democracy and provides several elections a year, with the 
majority of people casting their votes remotely by mail. We 
also understand that electronic elections are embedded in 
comprehensive e-Government initiatives, such as GU. The 
example of the Neuchâtel election shows that in the presence 
of so many elections even an electoral system at risk because 
of rudimentary security precautions and almost no 
transparency and verifiability can become entrenched. In June 
2008, the canton Neuchâtel used the Internet-based voting 
system in official elections for the seventh time 
(http://www.admin.ch/aktuell/00089/index.html? lang=de& 
msg-id=19093&no_cj_c=0).  
VII. CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
There are some interesting contrasts and similarities among 
these three Internet voting implementations, which are 
summarized in Table I. In all three elections, there are 
important and possibly unaddressed security issues with the 
voting client software. Clients can be infected with malware or 
can be remotely controlled as a part of a botnet, and users 
must be cautioned against malicious substitution, particularly 
if the same client is used for multiple elections. Even in the 
Estonian election, where external card readers and a PKI are 
used, the voter actually did not know what happened on her 
PC, as the card reader did not have its own keyboard and 
display. While the SERVE report [25] presents important 
information in this regard, it may not have been consulted in 
time to affect the design of these elections.  
All three elections have server side design weaknesses. 
Accuracy and privacy requirements are met only if the server 
programs function correctly and the particular parties behave 
properly. While we have no reason to doubt the integrity of 
the individuals involved, the security community accepts the 
principle that the integrity of a system should be largely based 
upon design and not on the implementation. Thus it is 
responsible to be respectfully concerned about apparent gaps 
and recommend the presentation of formal evidence of correct 
design and use. Precautions against Denial-of-Service attacks 
were not reported for any of the elections. In the case of the 
Dutch election, we found two additional severe security risks. 
The in-house transformation of mail votes to electronic ones is 
a weakness that could be exploited without careful oversight. 
In addition, the ability of voters to prove not only that they 
voted, but how they voted, may create opportunities for 
coercion. One relatively bright spot in these cases was the 
absence of major usability problems. We suspect that electoral 
officials considered the user interface of primary importance 
to acceptance by the voting public, and therefore paid great 
attention to this particular topic, save the absence of a 
Russian-language client in Estonia. Another exception was the 
difficulty in using vote verifiability reported by [22].  
All three case studies showed deficiencies in verifiability. 
Voters could not verify whether their votes had been counted 
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as cast, and consequently could also not verify the correctness 
of the overall tally. Although the Dutch election allowed 
voters to validate the correct counting of their votes, the 
practical procedure for this was so complicated that it was 
dysfunctional. Beyond these weaknesses, the auditing and 
testing of voting procedures and technology by independent 
authorities was practically non-existent in all three elections. 
The Estonian case included a large set of log files, these files 
could have been manipulated. In the case of the Dutch 
elections, auditing was even more challenging because mail 
votes were transformed into electronic votes. Forensic audit 
trails were not available in any case.  
Finally, all of the elections raise concerns about 
transparency. Large parts of the software was not open source, 
the documentation of the system and audit reports are 
unpublished, and in the Dutch case, the documentation of 
procedural details on the deletion of keys has been deemed 
security sensitive and classified confidential.  
 
TABLE I 
KEY WEAKNESSES OF ELECTION CASES 
  Requirements 
Elections 
Estonia The Netherlands Switzerland 
Security 
Accuracy 
 Votes can be altered and deleted on 
client side (card readers have no 
keyboard and no display) and on 
server side 
 Votes can be added on server side 
 Votes can be altered and eliminated 
on client side (software runs on 
unprotected PCs) 
 Votes can be deleted on voting 
server by ISP  
 Correctness on tally also depends 
on correctness of mail votes but 
cannot be checked by voters 
 Votes can be altered on client side 
through software on unprotected PCs) as 
well on server side 
 Votes can be added on server side 
 Correctness depends on voting software 
that is closed source 
Democracy 
 Implementation of authorization 
mechanism not analyzed by 
independent observers 
 No precautions against DoS 
attacks 
 Assurance that eligible voters can 
cast only one depends on the 
integrity of vendor  
 No precautions against DoS attacks 
are reported 
 Eligible voters cannot vote when their 
confirmation codes was abused on server 
side 
 No precautions against DoS attacks are 
reported 
Privacy 
 Vote Storage Server keeps a link 
between the encrypted vote and 
the identity of the voter 
 Secrecy of votes rests on private 
vendor 
 Voters can prove how they voted 
 Secrecy of votes can be violated by 
server-side software 
Usability  
 Discrimination of Russian-
speaking community (voting 
software available in Estonian 
language only) 
 Verifiability procedures are for most 






 No Voter Verified Audit Trail 
 Voters could also not check 
whether the counting was correct 
 Limited usability hindered voters to 
verify own vote 
 Merging mail votes with Internet 
votes makes it impossible to 
validate correctness of votes 
 Voters cannot verify whether their votes 
were counted as cast and whether the 








 No certification of system 
 No end-to-end accuracy test 
 Auditing conducted by a private 
company 
 Log files can be manipulated 
unnoticed 
 No reliable forensic audit trail 
available 
 No auditing or test reports are 
available 
 No certification of system 
 Forensic audit trail focuses on 
ballot revocations  
 
 Test elections and security audits were 
conducted but results are unpublished 
 Test votes cast by committee members 
are almost useless 
 Existence of forensic audit trail is unclear 
Transparency  
 E-voting system, including 
software and documentation, is 
not transparent to the public and 
to independent security experts 
 Final auditing report is not 
published 
 Reports on the concrete technologic 
infrastructure, organizational 
election processes, and auditing are 
not published 
 Server-side software is closed 
source 
 Only high-level descriptions of election 
procedures and technological 
components are available 
 Audits are unpublished 
 Usage of log files is unclear 
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of three recent large-scale Internet elections 
conducted in Estonia, the Netherlands, and the Swiss canton 
Neuchâtel revealed several apparent deficiencies in terms of 
security, verifiability, and transparency. Responsible 
authorities may have been unaware of these problems or they 
may have been confident of their defenses, or they may not 
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have disclosed all of the details of their work. In addition, the 
absence of public reporting of successful attacks have been 
detected or reported does not mean that none occurred [25, p. 
30]. It should also be noticed that with Internet-based 
government services becoming increasingly attractive, the 
opportunity and returns from attacks on voting systems also 
increase.  
In contrast to Estonia and some cantons in Switzerland, 
including Neuchâtel, only the Dutch authorities publically 
recognized the consequences of severe security issues of 
Internet voting system and stopped Internet voting in the 
Netherlands. One of the most urgent tasks for e-voting 
scientists and security researchers is the identification and 
presentation of weaknesses of Internet election systems where 
in other countries where Internet voting is still under 
consideration. Responsible authorities should also be shown 
that testing, auditing, and providing publicly available reports 
takes time and needs substantial funding. 
Public confidence in the electoral process depends on 
information and advice provided by security experts. The fact 
that overall only very few complaints of citizen or citizen 
initiatives have been reported in the face of the problems we 
identify shows that voters tend to accept missing transparency 
in Internet voting systems, to trust authorities, and to 
underestimate security threats. Sadly, we expect that this tacit 
confidence may be easily dissipated in the face of a failed 
election. Deficiencies of proposed Internet voting systems 
should be made transparent to voters in advance.  
We conclude from our analysis that future Internet voting 
initiatives should address some technological, organizational, 
and administrative properties which were apparently neglected 
in our three cases.  
Technology: The correctness of security and verifiability 
elements should depend on the design of the system and not 
assumptions of the proper implementation of programs or of 
organizational procedures, When designing an Internet voting 
system, well-known and well-understood e-voting protocols 
should be used. The design should also integrate procedures 
for creating log files and forensic audit trails. In order to 
increase security and verifiability, end-to-end schemes should 
be used so that voters do not have to rely on the integrity of 
election parties. If the public is required to procure voting 
hardware, the devices should be certified against tampering 
and have the ability to capture, display and protect its 
information from manipulation during its transfer to the 
ultimate host. Internet election design should include 
precautions against DoS attacks on server side, an increasingly 
popular and viable attack mode.  
Voters should be able to verify that their votes have been 
counted as cast. Although vote buying and coercion cannot be 
prevented, some systematic attacks may be prevented when 
voters receive proof of voting that cannot be reliably decoded 
by another person. The Estonian approach, which allows 
voters to overwrite their Internet votes as often as desired, 
should be considered.  
Organization: All of the case studies demonstrate the 
extraordinary responsibilities placed on electoral authorities 
and the technology providers supporting them. We suggest 
that Internet election technical operations be distributed to at 
least two independent parties. We argue further that e-voting 
providers be accountable for their code and procedures to 
parties competent to judge and review their work. E-voting 
providers must be held to stricter standards than e-Commerce 
vendors, and organizations with e-Commerce experience are 
not automatically qualified to operate Internet election 
technology. As elections are a core part of democracy, it 
seems to be too risky to rely on private organizations only, 
which are usually primarily interested in profit. Our 
confidence in election authorities increase with the 
deployment of independent third party reviews, independent 
of the organizations involved. 
Administration: The numerous technical weaknesses 
uncovered in our review suggests strongly that independent 
security experts should be consulted in advance of the design 
and implementation of Internet voting, that comprehensive 
tests of the full system be conducted with an eye towards 
identifying points of failure, and that the system and the 
overall election be audited by independent e-voting experts. It 
also seems reasonable to follow the OSCE recommendation 
[33], to cast relatively large numbers of test ballots during the 
election, where these test ballots are cast in a way that is 
indistinguishable from regular ballots. In addition, we argue in 
favor of full transparency of design, implementation, election 
procedures and test and auditing reports: While obscurity can 
protect the systems from some exposures, it is almost 
impossible to hide implementation details in the long run. A 
salient example is the accidental publication of Diebold voting 
machines source code on the Internet in 2003 [38].  
As accounting for technological, organizational, and 
administrative properties involves comprehensive and non-
trivial tasks, we argue that the elaboration and deployment of 
e-voting recommendations, such as [13] and [30], or even 
better, standards should be striven for, which can serve as 
overall guides for persons responsible for Internet elections. 
These standards will require regular revisions, however, as the 
inevitable progress of technology will introduce new 
vulnerabilities and enable the exploitation of old ones. 
This study has some important limitations of its own. First, 
we are aware that other researchers would have probably 
selected other elections, for example one of the local elections 
in the U.K. or the UMP Presidential Primary Election in 
France, and that our choices may not be representative. 
Second, we acknowledge that the use of incomplete public 
records to reconstruct technical architectures will make some 
elements appear neglected. In the case of sensitive 
applications, such as electoral systems, the obscurity of detail 
may be intentional to reduce exposure to attack. Some of the 
concerns that we raise may well be answered to the 
satisfaction of the various electoral commissions in private, 
and thus we do not question the accountability of these bodies. 
Our review illustrates potential gaps for consideration rather 
than judgment upon the efforts of government administration. 
Third, our study does not include any cost-benefit analysis. 
Some of the identified limitations in authorities’ efforts to 
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increase security and transparency may be rooted in financial 
restrictions, instead of being based on ignorance or neglect. 
Finally we recognize that the evolution of e-Voting 
architectures is taking place in parallel with active attempts at 
implementation. The planning and design of a voting scheme 
occurs months or years before its implementation, so it takes 
time for new research and experience to be seen. Comparative 
case study is one mechanism to highlight lessons be integrated 
in new electoral cycles.  
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